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Rajyaseva Setu
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Indian Polity · Complete Tutorial · Chapter 6

Amending the Constitution — and the Line Parliament Can't Cross

A constitution that can never change becomes a straitjacket; one that can change too easily stops being a constitution at all. Article 368 is where India tried to solve that puzzle, and the Kesavananda Bharati judgment of 1973 is the single most important case in deciding exactly how far Parliament's amending power actually goes.

Three speeds of change

  • Not every part of the Constitution is equally hard to change — Article 368 sets up three tiers. Some provisions (like creating a new state, or changing citizenship rules) can be altered by Parliament through a simple law, by simple majority, not even technically called a 'constitutional amendment'. Most provisions need a 'special majority' — two-thirds of members present and voting in each House, which must also be more than half of the total membership of that House. A smaller set of provisions that affect the federal structure (like changing how the Rajya Sabha is elected, or the Supreme Court's powers) need that special majority PLUS ratification by at least half of the state legislatures.
  • Comparison with the USA: amending the US Constitution needs two-thirds of both houses of Congress AND ratification by three-fourths of all 50 states — a deliberately brutal threshold that explains why the US has amended its constitution only 27 times in 230+ years (and the last substantive one, the 27th Amendment, took 203 years to ratify after being proposed). India has amended its constitution over 100 times in about 75 years. Neither approach is 'wrong' — America optimised for extreme stability, India optimised for the ability to keep adjusting a brand-new, still-settling nation.

Kesavananda Bharati (1973) — the case that drew the line

  • The case began as a property dispute — a Kerala monastery head challenging land reform laws — but the 13-judge bench (the largest in Indian history, still a record) ended up deciding something much bigger: does Article 368 let Parliament amend absolutely anything, including fundamental rights themselves? By a razor-thin 7-6 majority, the Court said no. Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights, BUT it cannot destroy or alter the Constitution's 'basic structure' — its core identity.
  • The judgment never gave one fixed, exhaustive list of what counts as 'basic structure' — later cases have added to it piece by piece: supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form of government, secularism, separation of powers, federalism, judicial review (confirmed in Minerva Mills, 1980), free and fair elections, and the independence of the judiciary, among others. This deliberate vagueness is itself a feature, not a bug — it lets courts respond to genuinely new threats to constitutional democracy without being boxed in by a fixed checklist drafted decades earlier.
  • Why this mattered immediately: right after Kesavananda Bharati, the 1975-77 Emergency saw the government push through the 39th Amendment (trying to put the Prime Minister's election disputes beyond judicial review) and the 42nd Amendment (trying to declare that no amendment could ever be questioned in court on any ground). In Minerva Mills (1980), the Supreme Court struck down that very attempt, ruling that the power to amend cannot include the power to grant itself unlimited power — judicial review itself is part of the basic structure, so Parliament cannot switch it off even by amending the Constitution to say so.

Key terms

Article 368
Lays down the procedure for amending the Constitution, in three tiers of difficulty.
Special majority
Two-thirds of members present & voting, which must also exceed half the total membership of that House.
Basic structure doctrine
Core features of the Constitution (from Kesavananda Bharati, 1973) immune from amendment, even by Parliament.
Minerva Mills case (1980)
Confirmed judicial review itself is part of the basic structure; struck down Parliament's attempt to make amendments unquestionable.

Quick revision

  • 1.Art. 368: 3 tiers — simple majority (minor), special majority (most), special majority + half the states' ratification (federal provisions).
  • 2.USA: 2/3 Congress + 3/4 of 50 states → only 27 amendments in 230+ yrs. India: ~100+ amendments in ~75 yrs.
  • 3.Kesavananda Bharati (1973), 13-judge bench, 7-6: Parliament can amend any part incl. FRs, but cannot destroy the 'basic structure'.
  • 4.Minerva Mills (1980): judicial review is itself part of the basic structure; struck down 42nd Amendment's attempt to make amendments unchallengeable.

Practice questions

Try writing your own answer first, then compare with the notes above.

  1. 1.Explain the three categories of constitutional provisions under Article 368, based on how difficult they are to amend.
  2. 2.What question did the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973) actually settle, and why is its 'basic structure' list deliberately left open-ended?
  3. 3.How does the extreme difficulty of amending the US Constitution compare with India's, and what trade-off does each approach make?

These are original explainer notes written for MPSC exam preparation — not sourced from or affiliated with any single textbook. For the exact constitutional text, refer to the Constitution of India on india.gov.in or legislative.gov.in.