History · India and the Contemporary World II · Chapter 4
The Age of Industrialisation
Popular imagination equates industrialisation with sudden factory growth and technological triumph — but the real history, in Britain first and then in colonial India, is slower, messier, and full of continuing hand labour. This chapter traces proto-industrialisation, the actual pace of factory growth in Britain, the destruction and survival of Indian weavers, and the rise of Indian factory industry under colonial constraints.
Before the Industrial Revolution: proto-industrialisation
- Even before factories dotted England/Europe, large-scale industrial production for an international market existed — historians call this proto-industrialisation. From the 17th-18th centuries, town merchants moved to the countryside, supplying money to peasants/artisans to produce for a growing international market, because powerful urban guilds (associations controlling production, competition, prices and entry into trades) blocked expansion within towns.
- As open fields disappeared and commons were enclosed, cottagers/poor peasants lost access to firewood/berries/vegetables/hay from common land, and needed new income; merchant advances to produce goods let them stay in the countryside, supplementing shrinking cultivation income while using the whole family's labour. A merchant clothier bought wool from a stapler, carried it to spinners, then to weavers, fullers, and dyers — with finishing done in London (hence London as a 'finishing centre') before export. Each merchant controlled hundreds of workers across these stages, though goods were produced within family farms, not factories.
The coming of the factory and the real pace of change
- The earliest English factories appeared by the 1730s, multiplying only from the late 18th century, with cotton as the new era's first symbol (raw cotton imports rose from 2.5 million pounds in 1760 to 22 million by 1787). A series of 18th-century inventions improved carding/twisting/spinning/rolling; Richard Arkwright's cotton mill then brought all processes under one roof/management, allowing careful supervision, quality control and labour regulation impossible when production was scattered across the countryside.
- But industrialisation's pace is often overstated: (i) cotton/metals were the most dynamic sectors, cotton leading till the 1840s, then iron-steel (spurred by railway expansion — England from the 1840s, colonies from the 1860s; Britain's 1873 iron-steel exports were double its cotton exports); (ii) new industries couldn't easily displace traditional ones — even by the century's end, under 20% of the total workforce was in technologically advanced sectors, and much textile output still came from domestic units, not factories; (iii) 'traditional' non-mechanised sectors (food processing, building, pottery, glass, tanning, furniture) grew too, through small, ordinary innovations, not stagnation; (iv) technology spread slowly — expensive, breakdown-prone machines made industrialists cautious. James Watt's improved steam engine (patented 1781) found almost no buyers for years; England had just 321 steam engines by the early 19th century (80 in cotton, 9 in wool, the rest in mining/canals/iron), used nowhere else for decades. Historians now recognise the typical mid-19th-century worker was a traditional craftsperson/labourer, not a machine operator.
Hand labour and steam power
- Victorian Britain had abundant labour (poor peasants/vagrants flooding cities), keeping wages low — so industrialists felt little pressure to install expensive labour-saving machines. Many industries had seasonal demand (gas works/breweries busy in cold months; bookbinders/printers before Christmas; shipyards in winter), and employers preferred hiring hand labour just for the season rather than investing in machinery. Handmade goods also suited a market wanting intricate designs/specific shapes that machines (built for standardised mass output) couldn't easily produce — mid-19th-century Britain made 500 varieties of hammers and 45 of axes by hand. The upper classes actually preferred handmade goods as a mark of refinement; machine-made goods were largely for colonial export. (Labour-short countries like 19th-century America, by contrast, pushed hard toward mechanisation.)
- Job-seekers depended on friendship/kin networks to find work quickly; others waited weeks in night refuges or Poor Law casual wards. Seasonal unemployment was structural — about 10% of the urban population was extremely poor even in good times, rising to 35-75% in slumps like the 1830s. Wage figures alone mislead, since real income depended on prices (which rose sharply during the Napoleonic Wars) and days actually worked, not just the wage rate. Fear of unemployment made workers hostile to new machines — women who survived on hand spinning attacked the Spinning Jenny (James Hargreaves, 1764) when it threatened to displace them, since a single wheel could now drive many spindles at once; this conflict lasted a long time. Building activity after the 1840s (roads, railway stations, tunnels, drainage) opened up more employment, doubling transport-industry workers in the 1840s and again over the next 30 years.
Industrialisation in the colonies: what happened to Indian weavers
- Before machine industries, Indian silk/cotton dominated world textile trade — fine varieties carried by Armenian/Persian merchants via camel routes to Central Asia, and by sea through Surat (Gujarat, linking to Gulf/Red Sea ports), Masulipatam (Coromandel coast) and Hoogly (Bengal, linking to Southeast Asia). Indian merchants/bankers financed this network — supply merchants advanced money to weavers, procured cloth and carried it to ports; port brokers negotiated sales to shippers. This Indian-controlled network broke down by the 1750s as European companies gained political concessions and then trade monopolies — Surat's trade fell from Rs 16 million (late 17th century) to Rs 3 million (1740s) as Bombay/Calcutta grew instead.
- After gaining political power in Bengal/Carnatic (1760s-70s), the East India Company asserted monopoly control instead of competing for supply: it appointed paid gomasthas (replacing traditional supply merchants who had long social ties to weaving villages) to supervise weavers and enforce a system of advances — weavers taking Company loans had to hand over cloth only to the gomastha, losing the ability to bargain or sell elsewhere. Weavers, forced to lease out their small landholdings and devote all family labour (including children/women) to weaving, clashed with the often-arrogant outsider gomasthas, who arrived with sepoys/peons and punished delays with beatings. Many weavers deserted villages to migrate where they had family ties, revolted alongside village traders, or simply refused loans and turned to agricultural labour.
- 'Manchester comes to India': despite an 1772 Company official's confidence that Indian textile demand could never fall, exports collapsed through the 19th century — piece-goods went from 33% of India's exports (1811-12) to just 3% (1850-51). British industrialists first secured import tariffs to keep Manchester goods competitive at home, then pushed the Company to sell British manufactures in India — cotton piece-goods rose from negligible imports in the late 18th century to over 31% of India's import value by 1850, over 50% by the 1870s. Weavers faced a double blow: their export market collapsed and cheap machine-made Manchester imports flooded the local market too (contemporary reports from Patna and the Koshti weavers of Central Provinces both describe trade 'entirely ceased' and emigration in search of any wage work). The 1860s brought a third blow — when the American Civil War cut US cotton supplies, Britain turned to India for raw cotton, pushing its price up so sharply that Indian weavers themselves couldn't afford it.
Factories come up in India
- The first Bombay cotton mill (1854, production from 1856) led the way — 4 mills with 94,000 spindles by 1862; Bengal jute mills followed (1855, 1862); Kanpur's Elgin Mill and Ahmedabad's first cotton mill in the 1860s; Madras's first spinning-weaving mill by 1874. Many early Indian entrepreneurs' capital traced back to the China trade (opium exports, tea imports): Dwarkanath Tagore (Bengal, set up 6 joint-stock companies in the 1830s-40s before collapsing in the 1840s business crisis); Bombay Parsis Dinshaw Petit and Jamsetjee Nusserwanjee Tata; Marwari Seth Hukumchand (Calcutta's first Indian jute mill, 1917); G.D. Birla's father and grandfather. Other capital came from Madras merchants trading with Burma/Middle East/East Africa, and from purely domestic financiers/bankers who diversified into factories.
- As colonial control tightened, Indian merchants were barred from trading manufactured goods with Europe, pushed toward exporting raw material/food grain instead, and edged out of shipping. Until WWI, European Managing Agencies (Bird Heiglers & Co., Andrew Yule, Jardine Skinner & Co.) controlled much of Indian industry — Indian financiers often provided capital while Europeans made all investment/business decisions, and Indian businessmen were barred from European chambers of commerce.
- Workers (584,000 in 1901, over 2,436,000 by 1946) mostly came from surrounding districts — over 50% of Bombay's cotton-mill workers came from neighbouring Ratnagiri (1911); Kanpur mills drew mainly from within Kanpur district. Millworkers typically moved between village and city, returning home for harvests/festivals (with mills granting seasonal leave). Getting a job depended heavily on the jobber — usually an old, trusted worker who recruited from his own village, helped newcomers settle, but also gained power to demand money/favours and control workers' lives.
Peculiarities of Indian industrial growth
- European Managing Agencies invested in export-oriented products (tea/coffee plantations on cheap colonial land, mining, indigo, jute), not goods for Indian consumers. Early Indian cotton mills avoided competing with Manchester on cloth, producing coarse yarn instead (sold to Indian handloom weavers or exported to China) since yarn wasn't a major British import. The swadeshi movement's boycott of foreign cloth, industrial groups organising for tariff protection, and a post-1906 decline in yarn exports to China (as Chinese/Japanese mills flooded that market) together pushed Indian industrialists from yarn toward cloth production — piece-goods output doubled 1900-1912.
- World War I transformed the picture: British mills busy with war production meant Manchester imports fell, giving Indian mills a vast home market and demand for war supplies (jute bags, uniform cloth, tents, leather boots, saddles) — production boomed, new factories opened, existing ones ran multiple shifts. Post-war, Britain (unable to modernise and compete with the US/Germany/Japan) never recaptured its old position, letting Indian industrialists consolidate.
- Large factories still formed only a small share of the economy — 67% of them concentrated in Bengal/Bombay (1911), and only 5% (1911) to 10% (1931) of the total industrial workforce worked in registered factories; the rest worked in small workshops/household units. Handloom production actually expanded (nearly trebling 1900-1940), partly via the fly shuttle (mechanical device speeding weft-into-warp weaving, raising productivity per worker) — used in over 35% of Indian handlooms by 1941, 70-80% in Travancore, Madras, Mysore, Cochin, Bengal. Weavers of finer varieties (Banarasi/Baluchari saris, Madras lungis/handkerchiefs with woven borders) survived best, since mills couldn't imitate specialised weaves and rich buyers' demand stayed stable even during famines that crushed demand for coarse cloth among the poor. These weavers/craftspeople worked hard, long hours with their whole families — not remnants of a vanishing past, but integral to industrialisation itself.
- Market for goods — advertising: Manchester manufacturers put labels on cloth bundles ('MADE IN MANCHESTER') as marks of quality, often illustrated with Indian gods/goddesses (Krishna, Saraswati, Lakshmi) for divine approval and familiarity, or royal figures (Maharaja Ranjit Singh) to lend prestige. From the late 19th century, manufacturers printed calendars — reaching even the illiterate, hung in tea shops and homes year-round. When Indian manufacturers advertised, the message was explicitly nationalist swadeshi: buy what Indians produce.
Key terms
- Proto-industrialisation
- Large-scale, non-factory production for an international market, organised by merchants in the countryside.
- Guild
- An urban association of producers controlling training, competition, prices and trade entry.
- Gomastha
- A paid East India Company servant who supervised weavers and enforced the advance system.
- Jobber
- A trusted senior worker who recruited/controlled new mill workers, often from his own village.
- Fly shuttle
- A mechanical weaving device that raised handloom productivity without needing factory-scale investment.
Quick revision
- 1.Proto-industrialisation (rural, merchant-controlled) preceded factories; guilds blocked urban expansion.
- 2.Even by 1900, <20% of Britain's workforce was in advanced industry — hand labour persisted widely.
- 3.Piece-goods: 33% of Indian exports (1811-12) → 3% (1850-51); cotton piece-good imports → 50%+ (1870s).
- 4.First Bombay cotton mill 1854; European Managing Agencies dominated industry till WWI.
- 5.WWI boosted Indian mills (Manchester imports fell); handloom output nearly trebled 1900-1940 via fly shuttle.
Practice questions
Try writing your own answer first, then compare with the notes above.
- 1.What is proto-industrialisation, and why did merchants move production to the countryside?
- 2.How did the East India Company's system of gomasthas and advances change weavers' lives?
- 3.Why did handloom cloth production expand in the twentieth century despite competition from mills?
These are original study notes prepared from the NCERT Class X textbook for exam preparation, not a reproduction of it. For the full text, maps and illustrations, read the original textbook on the official NCERT website (ncert.nic.in).